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Abstract 
 States have, of late, become increasingly active in environmental 
regulation. Renewable energy standards, which commit utilities in 
states to purchase power from renewable sources, and climate-change 
mitigation requirements of various kinds, are just two recent 
manifestations of state (and sometimes local) regulatory activism.  
This article employs state renewable portfolio standards (RPS) as a 
case study to examine how some RPS might fare if challenged under 
three constitutional doctrines that restrain states—preemption, the 
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine (DCCD), and the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV. Under current doctrine, it concludes, 
the DCCD poses the greatest threat to RPS programs, as many of 
those programs are currently constituted. This Article also assays 
prospects for judicial alteration of that doctrine in ways that would be 
favorable to state environmental innovations and suggests that the 
Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. 
Corey could serve as a blueprint for designing or refining RPS that 
would be resistant to constitutional challenges.  
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Introduction 
Though hardly quiescent in the past, states have become 
increasingly active in environmental regulation. Impatient with the 
perceived torpor or ideological hostility to regulation at the federal 
level, and despairing of any comprehensive, supranational solution to 
pressing issues like climate change, states have decided to fill the void. 
Renewable energy standards, which commit utilities in states to 
purchase power from renewable sources, and climate-change 
mitigation requirements of various kinds, are just two recent 
manifestations of state (and sometimes local) regulatory activism. 
However, when states begin to regulate in ways that impact other 
states (and other countries), constitutional doctrines protecting 
federal interests from state action come into play. Part I of this paper 
offers a primer on three constitutional doctrines that restrain states—
preemption, the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine (DCCD), and 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. Part II then uses 
state renewable portfolio standards (RPS) as a case study in how 
these doctrines could potentially limit state environmental initiatives. 
Under current doctrine, the DCCD poses the greatest threat to RPS 
programs, as many of those programs are currently constituted. But 
Part II also assays prospects for judicial alteration of the doctrine in 
ways that would be favorable to state environmental innovations. 
I. Federal Constitutional Restrictions on  
State and Local Regulation 
This section offers an overview of the three main restrictions on 
state and local regulatory authority. I first discuss the ability of 
Congress to preempt conflicting state and local legislation by 
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exercising the affirmative authority delegated to it under Article I of 
the Constitution. In addition, courts have long interpreted the 
delegation of regulatory authority over interstate commerce to contain 
implied restrictions on the states, prohibiting them from 
discriminating against or otherwise impermissibly burdening that 
commerce under the DCCD. Finally, state and local governments are 
forbidden by Article IV, section 2 from treating nonresidents 
differently from their own citizens under certain circumstance. Each 
of these doctrines or provisions has been invoked to limit state and 
local environmental regulatory schemes in the past; each has a 
continued role to play in current debates over state environmental 
policy, as we will see in Part II. 
A. Preemption 
1. Express Preemption 
Under Article VI of the Constitution, the U.S. Constitution, 
treaties made by the United States, and “the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance” of the Constitution are the 
“supreme Law of the Land,” notwithstanding contrary state laws or 
state constitutional provisions.1 If Congress has exercised its valid 
legislative authority, conflicting state laws must give way.2 Easy cases 
include those in which Congress included explicit language preempting 
contrary state law.3  
But Congress’s intent is not always so unequivocally stated. As 
the Court has noted: 
Absent explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized at 
least two types of implied pre-emption: field pre-emption, where 
the scheme of federal regulation is “so pervasive as to make 
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the 
States to supplement it,” . . . and conflict pre-emption, where  
1. U.S. Const. art. VI; see also Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 
505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (“Pre-emption may be either expressed or 
implied, and ‘is compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly 
stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure 
and purpose.’” (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 
(1977))). 
2. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210 (1824) 
(concluding that possession of valid federal coasting license by 
steamboat operator preempted state law granting competitor a 
monopoly on passage service between New York and New Jersey). 
3. See Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 970 (2012) (concluding 
that the Federal Meat Inspection Act’s preemption clause “prevents a 
State from imposing any additional or different—even if non-
conflicting—requirements that fall within the scope of the Act and 
concern a slaughterhouse’s facilities or operations”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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“compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical 
impossibility,” . . . or where state law “stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”4 
The Court’s “ultimate task in any pre-emption case is to determine 
whether state regulation is consistent with the structure and purpose 
of the statute as a whole.”5 
2. Implied Preemption 
Where Congress has not expressly preempted state legislation, 
then, the Court has found an implied intent to preempt in two broad 
categories of cases. Field preemption “reflects a congressional decision 
to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to 
federal standards.”6 Conflict preemption, on the other hand, impliedly 
preempts state laws that either makes compliance with state and 
federal law impossible, or, if compliance with both is possible, 
nevertheless presents an obstacle to one or more congressional 
purposes. 
a. Field Preemption 
United States v. Locke7 furnishes an example of field preemption 
of a state environmental statute. Washington State had promulgated 
a number of regulations relating to oil tankers. The Supreme Court 
held that the inclusion of numerous provisions related to the design, 
construction, repair, equipping, and crewing of tankers in the federal 
Ports and Waterways Safety Act meant that “Congress has left no 
room for state regulation of these matters.”8 
b. Impossibility Preemption 
Though a little long in the tooth, McDermott v. Wisconsin9 
provides an excellent illustration of “impossibility”-type conflict 
preemption. In McDermott, compliance with federal rules regarding 
 
4. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. De la 
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. 
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 
(1941)). 
5. Id. 
6. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012). See, e.g., Hines, 
312 U.S. 52 (preempting state alien registration statute; rejecting 
argument that requirements were parallel to and not in conflict with 
federal requirements). 
7. 529 U.S. 89 (2000). 
8. Id. at 111. 
9. 228 U.S. 115 (1913). 
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the labeling of corn syrup would have resulted in the product’s being 
mislabeled and subject to seizure under state law. The Court held 
that states could not pass laws that explicitly conflict with federal 
requirements, leaving the subject of the regulation incapable of 
complying with one regulatory regime without violating the other. In 
such cases, the state must give way.10 
c. Obstacle Preemption 
The other form of conflict preemption, termed “obstacle” 
preemption, is more subjective than impossibility preemption. In 
obstacle preemption cases, compliance with both federal and state 
regulatory regimes is possible, but in some cases the state regulatory 
choices are inconsistent with or harmful to broader federal policy 
objectives set by Congress. For example, in Crosby v. National 
Foreign Trade Council,11 the Court invalidated a Massachusetts law 
prohibiting the Commonwealth from contracting with companies that 
did business with the government of Myanmar. Because Congress 
considered and rejected much more wide-ranging penalties for 
companies currently doing business in the country, choosing instead 
to prohibit only new investment, the Court concluded that “the state 
Burma law [was] an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’s full 
objectives under the federal Act.”12 
Similarly, one provision of Arizona’s controversial immigration 
law, which prohibited undocumented aliens from working, applying 
for, or soliciting work in the state, was invalidated because it 
“enact[ed] a state criminal prohibition where no federal counterpart 
exists.”13 Congress, the Court held, “made a deliberate choice not to 
impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, 
unauthorized employment.”14 Arizona’s law, however: 
[W]ould interfere with the careful balance struck by Congress 
with respect to unauthorized employment of aliens. Although 
[the law] attempts to achieve one of the same goals as federal 
law—the deterrence of unlawful employment—it involves a 
conflict in the method of enforcement. The Court has recognized 
that a “[c]onflict in technique can be fully as disruptive to the 
system Congress enacted [sic] as conflict in overt policy.” . . .  
The correct instruction to draw from the text, structure, and 
history of [federal law] is that Congress decided it would be 
inappropriate to impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek or  
10. Id. at 133–34. 
11. 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
12. Id. at 373–86. 
13. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2503 (2012). 
14. Id. at 2504. 
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engage in unauthorized employment. It follows that a state law 
to the contrary is an obstacle to the regulatory system Congress 
chose.15 
Given the enormous federal legislative and administrative footprint in 
environmental regulation, any new state environmental initiatives—
especially those that are different in kind from or more stringent than 
existing federal requirements—will have to contend with arguments 
that they are either explicitly or impliedly preempted. Deciding 
whether or not they are has become more difficult in recent years  
as the Court has sent somewhat mixed signals in its implied  
conflicts cases. 
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine 
1. The Basic Doctrine 
Another important restraint on state and local laws, the DCCD 
prohibits subnational governments from discriminating against or 
otherwise impermissibly burdening interstate commerce. Laws that 
discriminate—either on their face or in their purposes or effects—are 
subject to a form of strict scrutiny requiring the state to demonstrate 
that it enacted the law for a legitimate (i.e., non-protectionist) 
purpose and that no less discriminatory means exist to effectuate that 
purpose.16 Truly nondiscriminatory laws, however, are subject to the 
more deferential Pike balancing test, whereby the law is upheld unless 
the challenger proves that the “burden imposed on [interstate] 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits.”17 The Supreme Court has not invalidated a law under Pike 
balancing in over twenty-five years; lower courts tend to invalidate 
using Pike balancing only where the putative local benefits appear to 
be a pretext for discrimination or can be proven to be nil.18  
15. Id. at 2505 (quoting Amalgamated Ass’n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor 
Coach  Emps. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 287 (1971)). 
16. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd., v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270–71 (1984) 
(invalidating law exempting locally-produced liquor and wine from 20% 
excise tax; holding that the purpose of the law was to insulate locally-
produced goods from competition); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 
617, 624–28 (1978) (holding that the explicit ban on in-state disposal of 
out-of-state garbage was subject to “virtually per se rule” of invalidity); 
Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352–53 (1977) 
(invalidating facially neutral law requiring all apple producers to use 
FDA grade or no grade on closed containers of apples; holding that the 
law discriminated in effect against out-of-state apples). 
17. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
18. See Brannon P. Denning, Bittker on the Regulation of 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce § 6.05 6-36 (2d ed. 2013) (“If a 
measure imposes significant costs, but no real benefits, or the benefits 
prove to be illusory, courts will invalidate them under Pike.”). 
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There is a third prong of the DCCD, but one of uncertain vitality: 
the prohibition on “extraterritorial” regulation.19 Probably the most 
that one can say about extraterritoriality is that it operates to 
restrain a state from attempting to control activities that occur 
wholly outside its jurisdiction.20 
2. Exceptions to the Doctrine 
The DCCD is subject to a number of exceptions that would be 
relevant to state environmental initiatives. First, the Court has held 
that discrimination in favor of a public entity does not violate the 
DCCD’s anti-discrimination principle if all other private entities (in-
state and out-of-state) are treated equally.21 Second, the Court has 
held that state and local governments acting as market “participants” 
as opposed to market “regulators” can escape the strictures of the 
DCCD.22 Finally, because the DCCD is a default rule, Congress itself 
can authorize the states to legislate in ways that would otherwise 
violate the DCCD using its affirmative power to regulate interstate 
commerce.23 The remainder of this section discusses each in turn. 
a. Discrimination in Favor of Public Entities 
In United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste 
Management Authority,24 the Court upheld a flow control ordinance 
directing that all solid waste be processed at a single, publicly owned 
facility. Though the United Haulers Court applied Pike balancing, it 
held that the forced use provision of the flow control ordinance was 
not “discriminatory” for DCCD purposes. The Court concluded that, 
at least where the public entity was performing traditional 
governmental functions, favoritism of publicly owned entities was 
likely motivated for reasons other than naked protectionism and that 
 
19. See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 326 (1989) (involving a 
Connecticut “price-affirmation statute tying Connecticut beer prices to 
the prices charged in” bordering states). For doubts about its future, see 
Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause: A Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 73 La. L. Rev. 979 (2013). 
20. See, e.g., Midwest Title Loans, Inc. v. Mills, 593 F.3d 660, 668–69 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (invalidating state application of consumer credit code to out-
of-state car title lender); Denning, supra note 19, at 992 & n.81 (offering 
other examples). 
21. See infra Part I.B.2.a.  
22. See infra Part I.B.2.b. 
23.  See infra Part I.B.2.c. 
24. 550 U.S. 330 (2007). 
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the DCCD should not prohibit decisions by governments to 
monopolize a given market.25 
b. The Market-Participant Exception 
Adopted in 1976 in a case involving a state initiative to dispose of 
derelict car hulks,26 the market participant doctrine is one of the best-
known exceptions to the DCCD. In short, the Court held that when 
states spend taxpayer funds, they are entitled to act as private actors 
do in choosing with whom to trade.27 For example, when South 
Dakota built a state-owned cement plant, it was entitled to process 
the orders of in-state customers before filling the orders of out-of-state 
purchasers during a cement shortage.28  
State and local governments may not, however, regulate beyond 
the market in which they participate. Thus, in South-Central Timber 
Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,29 a plurality held that Alaska’s 
attempt to force purchasers of state-owned timber to process that 
timber in-state prior to exportation exceeded the scope of the 
exception.30 Justice White stated: 
The limit of the market-participant doctrine must be that it 
allows a State to impose burdens on commerce within the 
market in which it is a participant, but allows it to go no 
further. The State may not impose conditions, whether by 
statute, regulation, or contract, that have a substantial 
regulatory effect outside of that particular market.31  
Alaska, he concluded, attached “downstream” restrictions on the 
processing of the timber after the sale had been completed. Alaska 
was not a participant in the timber processing market, but was trying 
 
25. Id. at 342–44; see also Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008) 
(applying United Haulers to state law exempting from income tax 
income derived from bonds issued by the taxing state or its subdivisions, 
but taxing income from all other bonds). For a critique of the public 
entities exception, see Norman R. Williams & Brannon P. Denning, The 
“New Protectionism” and the American Common Market, 85 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 247 (2009). The exception appears to apply only to the 
anti-discrimination principle; in both cases the Court applied Pike 
balancing. See Davis, 553 U.S. at 353–54; United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 
346–47; but see Davis, 553 U.S. at 354–56 (questioning whether the 
Court should apply balancing). 
26. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). 
27.   See id. at 809–10. 
28. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980). 
29. 467 U.S. 82 (1984). 
30. Id. at 98. 
31. Id. at 97. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·2014 
Environmental Federalism and State Renewable Portfolio Standards 
1527 
to regulate that market.32 In addition, the Court subsequently held 
that states may not attempt to “participate” in a market by the 
discriminatory granting or withholding of tax credits; taxation, the 
Court felt, was a “primeval governmental activity” in which the 
average private actor could not participate.33 
c. Congressional Redelegation 
The DCCD is a default rule, defeasible by congressional exercise 
of its affirmative power over interstate commerce. If Congress chooses, 
it may pass legislation disabling the DCCD, but it must “expressly 
state[]” its intent to do so.34 In 1945, for example, Congress passed the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which left the regulation of the “business of 
insurance” to the states.35 The Court upheld the Act in Prudential 
Insurance Co. v. Benjamin,36 authorizing South Carolina’s imposition 
of a three percent premium tax on foreign, but not domestic, 
insurance companies.37 
C. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV 
Article IV, section 2 entitles “[t]he Citizens of each State” to “all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”38 Derived 
from a similar provision in the Articles of Confederation, the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause prescribes a rule of substantial 
equality for nonresidents when certain “fundamental rights” are at 
 
32. Id. at 98–99. 
33. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988). Though the 
Court has never expressly so held, it has assumed in several cases that 
discriminatory cash subsidies do not violate the DCCD. See, e.g., Id. at 
278 (stating that “[d]irect subsidization of domestic industry does not 
ordinarily run afoul of” the antidiscrimination principle); see also West 
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 n.15 (1994). For a 
defense of the differential treatment despite the fact that the economic 
effects of subsidies versus tax credits are identical, see Dan T. Coenen, 
Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 Yale L.J. 
965 (1998); but see Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” 
Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 
379 (1998) (taking the view they ought to be treated equally for 
constitutional purposes). 
34. South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 91–92. 
35.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2006). 
36. 328 U.S. 408 (1946). 
37. Id. at 434–36. For the view that Congress does not have this power, see 
Norman R. Williams, Why Congress May Not “Overrule” the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 153 (2005). 
38. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2. 
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issue.39 For our purposes, the right to pursue a common calling or 
conduct a lawful trade on terms of substantial equality with residents 
and the right not to be taxed more heavily than residents are within 
the universe of fundamental rights recognized by the Court.40 To 
defend a discriminatory law against a Privileges and Immunities 
challenge, the state needs to “demonstrat[e] that ‘(i) there is a 
substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the 
discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial 
relationship to the State’s objective.’”41 In determining the substantial 
relationship, courts will usually consider the availability of less 
discriminatory means.42 
Despite the substantial overlap between the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause and the DCCD, significant differences exist that 
limit the utility of the Clause as an all-purpose tool to combat 
discrimination.43 Most importantly, only natural persons can invoke 
the protections of the Clause; corporations are not “citizens” under 
Article IV, section 2.44 Moreover, the Court has refused to recognize a 
market participant exception to the Privileges and Immunities 
 
39. See generally Brannon P. Denning, Why the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV Cannot Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Doctrine, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 384, 388–93 (2003) (discussing judicial 
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause from 1823 to 
modern times). That the Clause only guarantees equal treatment with 
regard to “fundamental rights” was first announced in Baldwin v. Fish 
& Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978), in which the Court refused 
to apply the Clause to elk hunting licenses, which were cheaper for 
residents than for nonresidents. 
40. See, e.g., Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 315 
(1998) (holding that the Privileges and Immunities Clause guarantees 
the right not to be taxed more heavily as nonresident); United Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 221–22 
(1984) (holding that the Clause protects the right of nonresidents to ply 
a trade on terms of substantial equality with residents). The Clause 
applies to municipalities as well as states. United Bldg. & Constr. 
Trades Council, 465 U.S. at 215–17. 
41. Lunding, 522 U.S. at 298 (citing Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 
U.S. 274, 284 (1985)). 
42. Piper, 470 U.S. at 284 & n.17 (“In deciding whether the discrimination 
bears a close or substantial relationship to the State’s objective, the 
Court has considered the availability of less restrictive means.”). 
43. See generally Denning, supra note 39, at 393–404 (detailing the 
differences between the scope of the Clause and that of the DCCD). 
44. Id. at 394–96. 
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Clause.45 Further, as a textual restriction on the states, Congress 
cannot override the Clause as it can the DCCD.46 
*** 
In the next Part, I will examine an increasingly popular state 
initiative to curb climate change in light of these constitutional 
restrictions. As many are currently designed, RPS programs are 
vulnerable to invalidation either through preemption (should the 
federal government ever enact a national RPS) or under the DCCD. 
As for the latter, however, I will discuss the possibility that changes 
in that doctrine may render it less hostile even to discriminatory  
RPS programs. 
II. Renewable Portfolio Standards:  
A Case Study in Environmental Federalism 
States have undertaken a number of environmental initiatives 
ranging from suing the EPA over its alleged failure to regulate carbon 
dioxide as a pollutant,47 to initiating cap-and-trade plans to restrict 
carbon emissions,48 to creating elaborate renewable portfolio standards 
(RPS) that require power generators to purchase power from 
renewable resources. All of these recent initiatives raise many of the 
constitutional issues discussed above. In this section, however, I want 
to use RPS as a case study in the vulnerability of some state 
environmental initiatives to constitutional federalism restrictions. 
RPS programs make particularly good vehicles for close 
examination of these issues for several reasons. First, they are 
widespread; thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have 
enacted them.49 Moreover, the states are—so far—writing on a blank 
slate. Congress has not enacted a federal RPS, though several have  
45. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 465 U.S. at 219–20; Denning, 
supra note 39, at 396–97. 
46. Denning, supra note 39, at 397–99; but see Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, 
Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1468, 1492–93 
(2007) (arguing that Congress should have power to waive the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause’s protections as well). 
47. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 515–26 (2007) 
(concluding that Massachusetts had standing to sue the EPA under the 
Clean Air Act). 
48. Clean Air Mkts. Grp. v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(concluding that New York State cap-and-trade program was preempted 
by the federal Clean Air Act). 
49. See Rules, Regulations & Policies for Renewable Energy, Database of 
St. Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, http://www.dsireusa. 
org/summarytables/rrpre.cfm (last visited Mar. 5, 2014); see also infra note 
53 and accompanying text. 
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been proposed. Further, many state RPS are drafted in ways that put 
them squarely in the crosshairs of, for example, the DCCD. But the 
vulnerability of RPS programs to challenge under the DCCD  
also provide an opportunity to explore the availability of various 
exceptions to the DCCD, as well as to discuss whether recent DCCD 
cases suggest an openness on the Court’s part to environmental 
innovations that might have been regarded as suspect a  
generation ago. 
A. An RPS Primer 
RPS programs “require electric utilities and other retail electric 
providers to include a specified percentage of electricity supply from 
renewable energy sources.”50 These obligations can be satisfied “by 
owning renewable energy facilities and producing their own renewable 
power or by purchasing such power from others’ facilities.”51 In the 
latter cases, utilities can satisfy their RPS requirements by purchasing 
Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) from qualifying generators. Those 
owning renewable power generation facilities in turn receive RECs—
usually one REC for each kilowatt hour (kWh) of renewable energy 
generated—and may sell these to other utilities who need to meet the 
RPS requirements.52 
As of 2012, “[t]wenty-nine states and the District of Columbia 
have some form of RPS,”53 which has now been expanded to thirty-
eight states.54 The popularity of RPS is due in part to the fact that 
“they provide various benefits including economic development, 
reduced emissions, increased job opportunities, establishment of more 
reliable energy supplies, and greater fuel diversification.”55 Not  
50. Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The 
Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable 
Power, 7 Tex. J. Oil Gas & Energy L. 59, 61–62 (2012); see also 
Nathan E. Endrud, Note, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their 
Continued Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and Possible Federal Legislation, 45 
Harv. J. on Legis. 259, 261 (2008) (“Renewable portfolio standards 
are obligations on retail sellers of electricity to include in their 
generation ‘portfolios’ a certain amount of electricity from ‘renewable’ 
energy sources.”). 
51. Endrud, supra note 50, at 261 (citing Nancy Rader & Scott 
Hempling, The Renewables Portfolio Standard—A Practical 
Guide 2 (2001), available at http://www.naruc.org/grants/Documents/ 
rps.pdf). 
52. But see infra notes 69–70 and accompanying text (describing 
“multipliers” awarded to certain activities). 
53. Ferrey, supra note 50, at 62. 
54. Rules, Regulations & Policies for Renewable Energy, supra note 49,  
55. Id. at 65 (citing K.S. Cory & B.G. Swezey, Renewable Portfolio 
Standards in the States: Balancing Goals and Implementation 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·2014 
Environmental Federalism and State Renewable Portfolio Standards 
1531 
surprisingly, then, states have tried to retain as many of those 
benefits as possible for their own citizens and “to prevent the 
‘leakage’ of” those benefits to other states.56 As one commentator 
notes, “[m]ost of these strategies involve limitations on which 
renewable energy sources are eligible to satisfy the states’  
RPS obligations.”57 
B. State Parochialism in RPS Programs 
State RPS programs vary in their particulars and implementation. 
I am less interested here in describing those programs in all of their 
complexity, than in highlighting features common to many initiatives 
that could be described as parochial or protectionist, thus making 
them particularly vulnerable to constitutional challenge. These 
features include (1) in-state and in-region restrictions on generation, 
purchase, or sale of power or requirements that RECs come from 
particular states or regions; (2) special multipliers altering the REC to 
KwH ratio for certain generators; and (3) tax-subsidy schemes 
benefiting in-state renewable energy construction projects. 
1. In-State and In-Region Restrictions  
These restrictions “limit the eligibility of qualifying renewable 
energy to that which is generated within the state or within the 
surrounding region . . . .”58 North Carolina’s RPS program, for 
example, caps the amount of energy purchased out-of-state at twenty-
five percent.59 California, Colorado, and Ohio contain similar 
preferences for in-state generated energy.60 Likewise, “[i]n-state 
consumption, metering, and sales requirements limit the eligibility of 
renewable energy to that which . . . is either physically consumed, or 
quantitatively verified (metered) within the state, or sold into the 
state.”61 Several states restrict the eligibility of RECs to energy 
generated either within the state or within the region.62 Iowa, 
Minnesota, and Hawaii prohibit the exportation of RECs.63 In 
addition, “[r]egional delivery requirements [mandate] that qualifying  
Strategies 7 (2007), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/ 
41409.pdf). 
56. Endrud, supra note 50, at 264. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. (citations omitted). 
59. Ferrey, supra note 50, at 76 (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-133.8(b)(2)(e) 
(2009)). 
60. Id. at 75. 
61. Endrud, supra note 50, at 264 (citations omitted). 
62. Ferrey, supra note 50, at 76–78. 
63. Id. at 86 n.229. 
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renewable energy be delivered into the regional power pool or 
independent system operator . . . control area serving the state.”64 
Finally, “[i]n-state benefits requirements require that qualifying 
renewable energy provide sufficient specific (named) or generic 
(unnamed) benefits to the state.”65  
Few of these provisions have generated reported cases. However, 
when Massachusetts passed a statute to stimulate development of 
renewable energy plants in 2008, one provision required companies 
that distributed electricity in the state to sign long-term contracts 
with renewable power companies that were located in Massachusetts.66 
A Canadian company filed a DCCD challenge to that provision, as 
well as another provision requiring the state Department of Energy 
Resources “to establish a requirement that a minimum percentage of 
electricity sales be from ‘new on-site renewable energy generating 
sources’ located in” state.67 The suit was later settled when 
Massachusetts agreed to grandfather in some existing contracts to 
supply electricity into which TransCanada had entered.68 Broader 
questions about the constitutionality of the law’s provisions, however, 
were not addressed. 
2. REC Multipliers for In-State Activities 
Over half the states with RPS programs provide preferential 
treatment for in-state or in-region generation for renewable power, 
usually through a “multiplier” that increases the ratio of RECs to 
kWh generated from 1:1 to 1+x:1.69 Arizona, Delaware, Michigan, and 
 
64. Endrud, supra note 50, at 264. 
65. Id. at 264–65. 
66. See Richard Lehfeldt, Woody N. Peterson & David T. Schur, Commerce 
Clause Conflict: In-state Green Mandates Face Constitutional 
Challenge, Pub. Utils. Fortnightly, Dec. 2010, at 38, 39; see also 
Carolyn Elefant & Edward A. Holt, The Commerce Clause 
and Implications for State Renewable Portfolio Standard 
Programs: Clean Energy States Alliance State RPS Policy 
Report 19 (2011). 
67. Elefant & Holt, supra note 66, at 21 (quoting Green Communities 
Act, ch. 169, sec. 32, § 11F(g), 2008 Mass. Acts 308, 334); see also Erin 
Ailworth, State Looking to Settle Suit Over Law on Clean Energy, 
Boston Globe, May 27, 2010, at B9, B11 (describing the suit and the 
state’s efforts to settle it). 
68. See Erin Ailworth, Deal Reached in State Energy Suit, Boston Globe, 
May 29, 2010, at B5, B6.  
69. Ferrey, supra note 50, at 72–78. 
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Montana also offer various incentives for using in-state components 
and labor in the construction of power generators.70 
3. SBC and Subsidy Programs 
As one author observes, “an alternative strategy to energy 
eligibility restrictions is to lower the costs of in-state renewable power 
generation through subsidies, which can be financed by system 
benefits charges on the energy sector at large or by general tax 
revenues.”71 Some states with RPS programs impose system-wide, per-
kWh charges (SBCs) on utility customers, the revenue from which is 
then placed in a segregated fund from which renewable power projects 
are subsidized.72 In some cases, the subsidies are available only for in-
state projects.73 California subsidizes the generation of renewable 
power and forbids its export to the grid.74 
C. The Constitutionality of RPS Programs 
The biggest potential threat to state RPS programs—although 
that threat has not yet materialized—would come in the form of a 
federal mandate.75 Unless well-drawn savings clauses were included, 
congressional legislation could expose the patchwork quilt of state-
level RPS to preemption challenges.76 This has already happened in 
 
70. Id. at 78–79 (noting that these states have “preferences or multipliers 
for RECs created at power generation units that employ an in-state 
workforce or in-state manufacture components”). 
71. Endrud, supra note 50, at 265. 
72. See Ferrey, supra note 50, at 70 (“Approximately one-third of U.S. 
 states have enacted SBC and ‘public benefit funds,’ as a direct subsidy 
 mechanism to support the development of renewable energy resources.” 
(citing Elizabeth Doris et al., State of the States 2009: 
Renewable Energy Development and the Role of Policy 65–66 
(2009), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/46667.pdf)).  
73. See id. at 80–84 (listing Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania 
as examples, either by statute or by almost exclusively spending funds 
on in-state programs). 
74. Id. at 84–85. 
75. See Endrud, supra note 50, at 280 (“[A] federal RPS program could 
create a different kind of constitutional barrier to state RPS programs, 
one which could result in the invalidation of such programs altogether: 
federal preemption under the Supremacy Clause.”). 
76. Id. at 281. The flipside is that Congress might immunize protectionist 
RPS programs from DCCD scrutiny, as it may do by legislating under 
its affirmative power to regulate interstate commerce. See supra Part 
I.A. One commentator has explicitly recommended that Congress do 
just this, arguing that “the overall utility of such restrictions in 
providing incentives for states to overcome public choice problems and 
enact aggressive standards may outweigh the resulting burdens on 
interstate commerce.” Endrud, supra note 50, at 285. 
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cases involving mitigation of cross-border air pollution and other state 
air quality initiatives.77 Even if some portion of state RPS 
requirements were included within the scope of one or more savings 
clauses, the Court will nevertheless apply implied preemption 
principles (conflict, obstacle, and field preemption) to that portion of 
the legislation not within the savings clause.78 While states could 
formerly claim a “presumption against preemption” to prevent the 
application of such principles, considerable question surrounds how 
much of that presumption remains. While federal RPS legislation has 
been introduced, however, none has become law.79 
Of the remaining restrictions, then, the DCCD presents the most 
obvious vehicle by which regulated entities could challenge state RPS 
requirements—especially those that seem to favor in-state over out-of-
state activities. As noted above, the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, while overlapping with the DCCD to a great extent, does not 
apply other than to natural persons, rendering it unlikely to play a 
large role in this context.80 
The Supreme Court has, in the past, invalidated quite a number 
of state laws alleged to advance some environmental goal. As 
 
77. See, e.g., Clean Air Mkts. Grp. v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(concluding that New York State cap-and-trade program was preempted 
by the federal Clean Air Act). 
78. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) 
(“[T]he savings clause . . . does not bar the ordinary working of conflict 
pre-emption principles.”); see also Scott Gallisdorfer, Note, Clean Air 
Act Preemption of State Common Law: Greenhouse Gas Nuisance 
Claims After AEP v. Connecticut, 99 Va. L. Rev. 131, 141–42 (2013) 
(“Although the Supreme Court has generally interpreted savings clauses 
to preclude any finding of express preemption, it has ‘decline[d] to give 
broad effect to saving clauses where doing so would upset the careful 
regulatory scheme established by federal law.’ Thus, savings clauses do 
not usually prevent the operation of ordinary implied preemption 
principles, and they may even create a negative inference ‘that 
everything else not preserved by [the savings clause] is preempted.’”) 
(footnotes omitted) (alteration in original). 
79. See Trevor D. Stiles, Renewable Resources and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 4 Envtl. & Energy L. & Pol’y J. 34, 50–51 (2009) 
(discussing proposals for federal RPS). 
80. Which is not to say that it hasn’t previously played a role in 
environmental or conservation contexts. For example, conservation was 
cited as a reason in Baldwin to charge out-of-state hunters more for elk 
hunting licenses. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371 
(1978). Similarly, in Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), South 
Carolina cited conservation of native shrimp stocks as a reason to 
charge out-of-state shrimpers 100 times more for a shrimping license 
than Palmetto State shrimpers. Id. at 389. The Court rejected this, 
however, finding in-state shrimpers just as likely to pose a threat as 
those from out-of-state. Id. at 398–99. 
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Professor Ferrey has noted, “[g]ood environmental motives do not 
matter or change the constitutional analysis.”81 The Court has, for 
example, invalidated a number of state efforts to prohibit or 
discourage the importation of out-of-state solid waste.82 It has also 
invalidated attempts to require the use of a privately owned in-state 
facility, prohibiting the disposal of waste at other, possibly cheaper, 
out-of-state disposal sites.83 The Court has also held unconstitutional 
state efforts to conserve valuable resources by, for example, 
prohibiting the exportation of minnows,84 restricting nonresident 
fishing,85 and barring the export of water.86 
In a case with obvious implications for the fate of discriminatory 
RPS programs, the Court struck down, on DCCD grounds, an 
Oklahoma law requiring coal-fired plants located in the state to favor 
local industry by requiring it to burn at least ten percent Oklahoma-
mined coal.87 The outcome of Wyoming v. Oklahoma is of a piece with 
numerous earlier cases rejecting state defenses that discriminatory 
laws were motivated not by a desire to harm out-of-state actors, but 
rather to benefit in-state industries.88 A common feature of these laws 
is that they facially discriminated against out-of-state products or 
 
81. Ferrey, supra note 50, at 98. 
82. See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 
(1994) (invalidating a discriminatory per ton waste disposal fee); Fort 
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 
353 (1992) (invalidating a state law permitting counties to prohibit out-
of-county waste); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 
(1992) (invalidating a disposal fee on out-of-state hazardous waste 
shipped into the state); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 
(1978) (invalidating a ban on importation of out-of-state solid waste). 
83. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 
(1994). But see United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste 
Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (refusing to extend C & A Carbone 
to an ordinance requiring disposal at a publicly owned processing 
facility); see also infra Section II.D.3 (discussing possible implications of 
United Haulers for RPS programs). 
84. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
85. Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977) (striking down 
Virginia restriction on nonresident fishing in Chesapeake Bay). 
86. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). 
87. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992). 
88. See, e.g., Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (rejecting 
Hawaii exemption of locally-produced wine and liquor from excise tax); 
Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928) (invalidating 
statute forbidding export of shrimp before heads and tails removed 
locally); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (striking 
down state statute requiring in-state natural gas customers be preferred 
over those from out-of-state). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·2014 
Environmental Federalism and State Renewable Portfolio Standards 
1536 
economic actors, could not take advantage of one of the DCCD’s 
exceptions, and could not satisfy the DCCD’s heightened scrutiny 
applicable to discriminatory law. 
It appears that a substantial number of state RPS provisions are 
discriminatory, either because they have preferences for power 
generated in state, or limit the amount of out-of-state RECs that can 
be used to satisfy the required renewable percentage.89 Even “in-region 
location requirements, while not discriminatory towards certain 
neighboring states, would still be facially discriminatory against the 
remainder of states . . . .”90 To the extent they are related to the 
geographic origins of the renewable power generated, multipliers, too, 
could be seen as discriminatory. Could these programs nevertheless 
pass muster under either an exception to the DCCD or because there 
are no less discriminatory means to meet the goals of RPS program? 
I begin with the exceptions to the DCCD. Because Congress has 
not explicitly authorized discriminatory aspects of these programs,91 
states would either have to fit their programs under the newly minted 
“public entity” or the older market participant exception. Either 
would be a difficult fit unless each is expanded by the Court. Putting 
aside the question whether climate change mitigation is a “traditional 
governmental function,” the public entities exception would not apply 
unless the utilities from which consumers obtained their power were 
(to some uncertain extent) government-owned. As described in the 
literature, it does not seem as if state governments have monopolized 
the renewable energy market and forced all consumers to buy from 
state-owned generators, regardless whether customers would prefer to 
purchase power elsewhere. 
Because RPS are mandates to private utilities to meet certain 
renewable energy targets prescribed by the states, moreover, it would 
be difficult for states to claim that they were merely participating in 
the energy market.92 These prescriptions apply to the supply of energy 
to all the utilities’ customers, not just to the state as a customer. 
Could the laws escape invalidation because there are no less 
discriminatory means available to effectuate the goal of these RPS 
 
89. See Ferrey, supra note 50, at 72–85, 106 (concluding that “[m]any 
states” facially discriminate). 
90. Endrud, supra note 50, at 271 (citing Nancy Rader & Scott 
Hempling, The Renewables Portfolio Standard: A Practical 
Guide A-1 (2001), available at energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/ 
DocumentsandMedia/narucrps.pdf). 
91. See supra Section I.B.2.c; see also Endrud, supra note 50, at 285 
(arguing that Congress should consider doing so). 
92. Ferrey, supra note 50, at 103–05 (agreeing that because RPS programs 
are regulatory in nature, the market participant exception likely is not 
available). 
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programs—viz., to reduce harmful emissions and foster the creation of 
viable alternative energy sources? Assuming that the latter would 
constitute a legitimate (i.e., non-protectionist) end, the answer to the 
question largely turns on what is meant by “less discriminatory 
means”? Does the requirement mean states are obligated to use the 
least discriminatory means possible? Or must it at least show that a 
good reason—unrelated to economic protectionism—exists for taking 
account of the regulated subject’s geographic origin?  
In Maine v. Taylor,93 the Court upheld a ban on the importation 
of baitfish into Maine, because of fears that parasites from non-native 
species could endanger the native fish population.94 The Court 
accepted the trial court’s finding that no test was available to screen 
the imported fish at the border and further held that the State was 
not obligated to create one before interfering with trade.95 Elsewhere I 
have argued that the outcome in Taylor suggests that when there’s no 
taint of protectionism in its end, the state should receive some leeway 
in the means it employs and that “less discriminatory” should not 
ipso facto be read to require that the state employ the least 
discriminatory means.96 
The problem for many state RPS programs, however, is that they 
appear specifically designed to secure economic benefits for the state, 
or at least prevent or minimize the export of those benefits to other 
states.97 Several states specifically instruct implementing agencies to 
maximize the in-state benefits when writing regulations or drafting 
policies to operationalize the programs.98 Under current doctrine—an 
important qualification to which I’ll return—courts are likely to look 
skeptically on such explicitly discriminatory programs. 
However, programs that combine nondiscriminatory taxes with 
subsidies to in-state renewable energy projects99 could fare much 
better, despite the Court’s holding in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. 
Healy.100 West Lynn Creamery invalidated a tax-subsidy program 
designed to benefit Massachusetts dairy farmers. A nondiscriminatory 
tax was levied on the sale of milk, much of which came from out of 
 
93. 477 U.S. 131 (1986). 
94. Id. at 137–52. 
95.   Id. at 146–47. 
96. Brannon P. Denning, One Toke Over the (State) Line: Constitutional 
Limits on “Pot Tourism” Restrictions, 66 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014), available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2277078 (last revised Dec. 18, 2013). 
97. See supra Section II.B. 
98. See supra Section II.B.1.  
99. See supra Section II.B.3. 
100. 512 U.S. 186 (1994). 
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state, by milk dealers. The revenue was placed in a special fund and 
used to dole out subsidies to the Massachusetts farmers.101 While 
acknowledging that each component of the scheme was 
constitutionally permissible, the combination, the Court held, could 
not withstand scrutiny. As it operated, only out-of-state milk 
producers ended up paying taxes; in fact, in-state farmers often 
received much more than the value of the tax imposed.102 This was 
too much for even a staunch DCCD critic like Justice Scalia, who 
concurred in the Court’s decision.103 
Important differences exist between Massachusetts’s program and 
some SBC/subsidy plans that have been put in place. The fatal flaw 
in Massachusetts’s plan was that in actual operation, the 
nondiscriminatory nature was illusory because of the offsetting 
subsidies. As a result of the latter, only out-of-state milk producers 
paid the tax.104 By imposing a system charge on all power consumers, 
you reduce the chances that only out-of-state interests will pay the 
SBCs because in staters subject to the charge will be made whole (or 
more) by receiving subsidies. The identity of the groups subject to the 
tax and then eligible for subsidies will likely not, as it did in West 
Lynn Creamery, divide along in-state/out-of-state lines. 
D. The Future of the DCCD 
The analysis above assumes no change in current doctrine. 
However, the current Court has signaled some interest in restricting 
the scope of the DCCD in ways that could aid RPS programs’ 
defenses against constitutional challenges. First, the Court could 
expand a prior holding requiring that plaintiffs prove they were 
“similarly situated” to the in-state beneficiary of an allegedly 
discriminatory law or regulation. Second, recent cases demonstrate a 
willingness to expand the market participant doctrine or create entire 
new exceptions to the DCCD. Finally, the Court might simply restrict 
the DCCD by requiring that discriminatory or protectionist intent be 
proven to prevail. 
1. “Similarly Situated” 
In General Motors Corp. v. Tracy,105 the Court upheld a state 
exemption from sales and use taxes for certain in-state sales of natural  
101. Id. at 190–91. 
102. Id. at 194. 
103. Id. at 207–12 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
104. The Court stressed this element in a subsequent case. Pharm. Research 
& Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 670 (2003) (“[T]he order 
effectively imposed a tax on out-of-state producers to subsidize 
production by their in-state competitors.”). 
105. 519 U.S. 278 (1997). 
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gas. Ohio imposed a use tax on property purchased outside the state 
and brought into the state for use. It exempted natural gas purchased 
from a “natural gas company,” defined as anyone “engaged in the 
business of supplying natural gas for lighting, power, or heating 
purposes to consumers within the state,” and further construed by the 
Ohio Supreme Court to be limited to public utilities.106 GM sued, 
alleging that the exemption discriminated against out-of-state natural 
gas—it purchased gas for operating its plants from out-of-state 
independent gas sellers and had to pay a use tax on the natural gas.107 
The Court, however, rejected the claim, holding that “the market 
for exempt natural gas purchases from local public utilities was 
discrete from the market for taxable natural gas purchases from 
interstate gas marketers.”108 In other words, the Court concluded, 
because the in-state and out-of-state natural gas in the case were not 
similarly situated “there can be no local preference, whether by 
express discrimination against interstate commerce or undue burden 
upon it, to which the dormant Commerce Clause may apply.”109 
Were states to abandon the geographic limitations in favor of 
specifying, for example, the types of renewable energy that will satisfy 
the RPS program requirements, as many commentators have advised 
doing, a DCCD challenge might be harder to maintain even if the 
eligible renewable energy correlates with a particular state or region. 
If states can explain that different types of energy or even different 
types of renewable energy represent discrete markets, as in Tracy, 
then they might avoid invalidation. Even regulations regulating 
transmission distance might be defensible, despite having a geographic 
component, if regulators can demonstrate why it compromises the 
programs’ goals to import energy from far away as opposed to 
requiring it to be transmitted closer to home.  
2. Expand Existing Exceptions or Create New Ones 
With the “public entities” exception, the Roberts Court showed 
itself willing to limit the DCCD by simply carving out an exception to 
the anti-discrimination principle. The flow control ordinance in United 
Haulers110 was clearly market regulation, not market participation—
private actors usually lack the legal authority to force customers to  
106. Id. at 281–82 (citing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5727.01(D)(4) (1996); 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5727.01(E)(4) (Supp. 1990); Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. § 5727.01(E)(8) (1986); Chrysler Corp. v. Tracy, 652 
N.E.2d 185 (Ohio 1995)). 
107. Id. at 285–86. 
108. Walter Hellerstein et al., State and Local Taxation: Cases 
and Materials 151 (9th ed. 2009). 
109. Tracy, 519 U.S. at 300. 
110. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
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buy goods or services from it. However, as Norman Williams and I 
have observed elsewhere, the exemption is undertheorized and its 
scope uncertain.111 For example, it is not at all clear how much 
involvement by the state is needed to convert something into a 
“public entity.”112 Perhaps states could argue that because the state 
has chosen to monopolize the provision of power—even where it 
delegates that power to a private entity—it can dictate the terms on 
which that entity purchases power. States would likely have little 
trouble selling the claim that the provision of electricity is a 
“traditional governmental function.” 
On the other hand, it might be that the Court expands the 
market participant doctrine to encompass at least some aspects of 
RPS programs. Just last term the Court rejected a DCCD challenge 
to Virginia’s Freedom of Information Act, which permitted queries 
only by state citizens.113 While most of the opinion addressed the 
challengers’ Privileges and Immunities Clause claim, the Court briefly 
addressed the DCCD at the end. In his opinion, Justice Alito 
suggested the Act could be defended under the market participant 
exception because the market for publicly available state information 
“is a market for a product that the Commonwealth has created and of 
which the Commonwealth is the sole manufacturer.”114  
Similarly, it might be said that the state is the sole creator of 
RECs and that the market for them would not exist but for the 
state’s involvement; therefore, the state is entitled to offer whatever 
ratio of credits to kWhs it deems appropriate, and restrict the transfer 
of those RECs however it wishes. Or it might agree that because 
there is no economic difference between a cash subsidy and a tax 
exemption or credit, states can “participate” in the market for 
renewable energy through the use of its tax code to stimulate 
construction of renewable energy projects.115 
3. Further Restrict Scope of the DCCD 
Just as United Haulers simply created a categorical exception 
from the DCCD’s antidiscrimination principle for discrimination in 
favor of public entities, the Court might be inclined to further roll 
back the coverage of the DCCD in cases involving RPS programs. In  
111. Williams & Denning, supra note 25, at 262–79. 
112. Id. at 282–92. 
113. McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1713 (2013). 
114. Id.  
115. Cf. Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 343–48 (2008) (plurality 
op.) (Souter, J.) (arguing that Kentucky’s discriminatory taxation of 
income produced by out-of-state municipal bonds could be defended 
under the market participant doctrine). But see Williams & Denning, 
supra note 255, at 296–304 (criticizing such an expansion). 
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McBurney, for example, Justice Alito questioned the DCCD’s 
applicability. “Virginia’s FOIA law neither ‘regulates’ nor ‘burdens’ 
interstate commerce,” he wrote, “rather, it merely provides a service 
to local citizens that would not otherwise be available at all.”116 At 
other points in the opinion, he stressed the lack of discriminatory or 
protectionist intent behind Virginia’s law.117  
Justice Alito’s discussion echoed Chief Justice Roberts’ 
justification for the newly minted exception created in United 
Haulers, in which he referred to reasons other than simple economic 
protectionism for favoring public entities over in-state and out-of-
state private entities. This might suggest that the Court is poised to 
require proof of discriminatory or protectionist intent for state laws 
challenged under the DCCD.118 If so, that would mark a departure 
from current doctrine, and would likely make DCCD claims more 
difficult to win.119 But criticism of the DCCD on the Court has 
intensified;120 the Court has invalidated only one law under the DCCD 
in the last decade.121 It is not out of the realm of possibility that the 
Court would radically alter doctrine, especially if it has a sense that, 
relative to forty or fifty years ago when the contemporary DCCD 
began to really take shape, state laws are much less nakedly 
protectionist today.122 
 
116. McBurney, 133 S. Ct. at 1720. 
117. See id. at 1715–19 (finding the petitioner “offered no proof—that the 
challenged provision . . . was enacted in order to provide a competitive 
economic advantage for Virginia citizens”). 
118. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–45 (1976) (requiring proof 
of discriminatory intent to sustain a race discrimination claim under the 
Equal Protection Clause, and holding that disparate impact alone is not 
sufficient). 
119. Scholars have criticized Davis on similar grounds. See, e.g., Laurence 
H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16–20, at 1511–14 (2d 
ed. 1988); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal 
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 
(1987); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 
Stan. L. Rev. 1105 (1989); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent 
and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 935 (1989). 
120. Only Justices Kennedy and Alito dissented in United Haulers and Davis. 
Davis, 553 U.S. at 362–76 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); United Haulers 
Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 356–
71 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens dissented in the latter, 
but not the former. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 356–71 (Alito, J., 
dissenting).  
121. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (invalidating New York law 
permitting mail-order direct shipment of in-state, but not out-of-state 
wines). 
122. Cf. Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. 
Ill. L. Rev. 145, 145–46 (arguing that changes in constitutional 
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E. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey:123 A Harbinger? 
The recent Rocky Mountain Farmers Union case, in which parties 
challenged various provisions of California’s new low carbon fuel 
standards suggests that even without wholesale changes to the 
DCCD, courts may grant states considerable leeway in crafting their 
RPS programs, at least where the programs are untainted by 
economic protectionism.124 In seeking to reduce state greenhouse gas 
emissions, California crafted fuel standards that employed “‘a lifecycle 
analysis’ to determine the total carbon intensity of a given 
transportation fuel.”125 Instead of simply focusing on the emissions 
from tailpipes in the state, California chose “to account for emissions 
associated with all aspects of the production, refining, and 
transportation of a fuel, with the aim of reducing total, well-to-wheel 
[greenhouse gas] emissions.”126 
In order to compare the emissions of fuels created from a diverse 
group of “feedstocks,” California created tables of fuels that 
“incorporate[d] comprehensive data on the lifecycle emissions of 
various fuels.”127 These tables included data on the emissions from 
production and transportation of the fuels before they entered the 
tanks of California vehicles.128 The schedules issued by the state 
included “default pathways” comprised of “average values” of the 
carbon intensity of a fuel.129 In addition, regulated parties were 
entitled “to register individualized pathways” that either “rel[y] in 
part on a default pathway but proposes a replacement for one or more 
of the pathway’s average values” or “a new, individualized pathway” 
for the fuel.130 
According to the court, “[e]thanol production is a resource-
intensive process, requiring electricity and steam. . . . The choices of 
type of feedstock, source of electricity, and source of thermal energy 
affect the carbon intensity of the fuel pathway.”131  
 
doctrine are caused by “shifts” in Justices’ “tacit factual assumptions 
underlying legal doctrine”). 
123. 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014). 
124. Id. at 1077. 
125. Id. at 1080. 
126. Id. at 1081 (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 95481(a)(38) (2007)). 
127. Id.  
128. Id. at 1082. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 95486(c),(d) (2007)). 
131. Id. (citing Changes to Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 
14,745 (Mar. 26, 2010)). 
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To determine the total carbon intensity values for each ethanol 
pathway, the [state] model considers the carbon intensity of 
factors including: (1) growth and transportation of the 
feedstock, with a credit for the GHGs absorbed during 
photosynthesis; (2) efficiency of production; (3) type of 
electricity used to power the plant; (4) fuel used for thermal 
energy; (5) milling process used; (6) offsetting value of an 
animal-feed co-product called distillers’ grains, that displaces 
demand for feed that would generate its own emissions in 
production; (7) transportation of the fuel to the blender in 
California; and (8) conversion of land to agricultural use.132 
These factors were then “separate[d] . . . into those that are correlated 
with location and those that are not, using a regional identifier as a 
shorthand for the factors correlated with location.”133 While 
“[e]missions from transporting the feedstock and the refined fuel are 
related to location,” the court noted, “they are not directly 
proportionate to distance traveled.”134 The court further explained 
that “[t]ransportation emissions reflect a combination of: (1) distance 
traveled, including distance traveled inside California to the fuel 
blender; (2) total mass and volume transported; and (3) efficiency of 
the method of transport.”135 This combination can produce some 
apparently anomalies. “California ethanol produces the most 
transportation emissions because California grows no corn for ethanol, 
so its producers import raw corn, which is bulkier and heavier than 
the refined ethanol shipped by producers in Brazil and the 
Midwest.”136 Brazilian ethanol, which comes by ship, produces few 
transportation emissions relative to the distance traveled because of 
the efficiency of shipping.137 A number of ethanol producers obtained 
individualized pathways as well.138 
As for crude oil, to which the state also assigned values, it 
“presents different climate challenges from ethanol and other 
 
132. Id. at 1083. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. (citing Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency Air Res. Bd., Detailed 
California-Modified GREET Pathways for Brazilian 
Sugarcane Ethanol: Average Brazilian Ethanol, With 
Mechanized Harvesting and Electricity Co-product Credit, 
With Electricity Co-product Credit (Sept. 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/092309lcfs_cane_etoh.pdf). 
138. Id. at 1084.  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·2014 
Environmental Federalism and State Renewable Portfolio Standards 
1544 
biofuels.”139 As the court noted, “[c]orn and sugarcane absorb carbon 
dioxide as they grow, offsetting emissions released when ethanol is 
burned. By contrast, the carbon in crude oil makes a one-way trip 
from the Earth’s crust to the atmosphere.”140 
For crude oil and its derivatives, emissions from combustion are 
largely fixed, but emissions from production vary significantly. 
As older, easily accessible sources of crude are exhausted, they 
are replaced by newer sources that require more energy to 
extract and refine, yielding a higher carbon intensity than 
conventional crude oil. As extraction becomes more difficult, 
emissions from crude oil will only increase, but [the state] 
expects that fuels with carbon intensity values fifty to eighty 
percent lower than gasoline will be needed to meet its emissions-
reduction targets. No matter how efficiently crude oil is 
extracted and refined, it cannot supply this level of reduction. 
To meet California’s ambitious goals, the development and use 
of alternative fuels must be encouraged.141 
To provide the encouragement, the state “required regulated parties 
to meet the Fuel Standard’s carbon-intensity-reduction targets by 
supplying alternative fuels or buying credits from the sellers of 
alternative fuels.”142 
To calculate the carbon intensity score of crude oil, the state 
distinguished between “existing” sources (those comprising “at least 
two percent of California’s crude-oil market in 2006,” the year used to 
calculate baseline values) and “emerging” sources (everything else).143 
It also differentiated between “high-carbon-intensity crude oil” 
(HCICO) and non-HCICO.144 Existing and emerging non-HCICO  
were assigned a carbon intensity value equal to the 2006 average of 
grams of CO2 equivalent produced per mega joule of energy.145 
Existing HCICO were assigned a separate average value, while 
emerging HCICO were required to obtain an individual measure of  
carbon intensity.146 
Various parties challenged the values assigned to imported 
ethanol, as well as those developed for crude oil sold in the state. The 
 
139. Id.  
140. Id.  
141. Id. at 1084–85. 
142. Id. at 1085.  
143. Id. 
144. Id.  
145. See id. (comparing the 2006 averages for HCICO and non-HCICO).  
146. Id. 
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parties alleged that the ethanol standards facially discriminated 
against out-of-state ethanol and that the crude oil standards 
discriminated against out-of-state crude oil in purpose and effect.147 
The parties also alleged that the crude oil standards impermissibly 
regulated extraterritorially.148 The Ninth Circuit rejected all of the 
DCCD claims.  
The court framed its inquiry as whether California’s assignment of 
different carbon intensities to ethanol from different regions can be 
explained by “‘some reason, apart from their origin . . . .’”149 It 
concluded that California’s assignment of different values was driven 
not by geography, but rather by differences in carbon intensity.150 
That constituted a nondiscriminatory reason for the higher carbon 
intensity value. Further, the court noted, “[t]he Fuel Standard does 
not isolate California and protect its producers from competition.”151 
In fact, it observed, “the lowest ethanol carbon intensity values, 
providing the most beneficial market position, have been for pathways 
from the Midwest and Brazil.”152 The court found nothing 
discriminatory in California’s insistence that it include “emissions 
from the transportation of feedstocks and fuels” in the carbon 
intensity score.153 “California,” it observed, “if it is to have any chance 
to curtail GHG emissions, must be able to consider all factors that 
cause those emissions when it assesses alternative fuels.”154 It 
concluded: 
The dormant Commerce Clause does not require California to 
ignore the real differences in carbon intensity among out-of-state 
ethanol pathways, giving preferential treatment to those with a 
higher carbon intensity. These factors are not discriminatory 
 
147. Id. at 1086.  
148. Id. For a brief explanation of the extraterritorality prong of the DCCD, 
see supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. See also Denning, supra 
note 19 (suggesting that DCCD extraterritoriality is largely moribund). 
149. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1089 (quoting City of 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)). 
150. See id. at 1090 (“Comparing all sources of ethanol and all factors that 
contribute to the carbon intensity of an ethanol pathway, it appears 
that CARB’s method of lifecycle analysis treats ethanol the same 
regardless of origin, showing a nondiscriminatory reason for the unequal 
results of this analysis.”). 
151. Id. 
152. Id. (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 95486(b)(1) (2007)).  
153. Id. at 1091–92. 
154. Id. at 1090. 
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because they reflect the reality of assessing and attempting to 
limit GHG emissions from ethanol production.155 
The court also rejected the discriminatory purpose and effect claims 
against the crude oil provisions. Though some California oil was 
assigned a carbon intensity value that was much lower than its 
individual carbon intensity, other California oil “suffered more from 
the same arrangement than light crude from Alaska or abroad.”156 
Seen in context, then, the court found no evidence of discriminatory 
purpose behind the crude oil provisions; moreover, it concluded the 
parties had not produced sufficient evidence of an actual 
discriminatory effect sufficient to trigger heightened scrutiny.157 
The Ninth Circuit also rejected arguments that the fuel standards 
attempted to regulate extraterritorially by attempting to control out-
of-state conduct.158 “The Fuel Standard,” the court wrote, “regulates 
only the California market.”159 
The Fuel Standard . . . . says nothing at all about ethanol 
produced, sold, and used outside California, it does not require 
other jurisdictions to adopt reciprocal standards before their 
ethanol can be sold in California, it makes no effort to ensure 
the price of ethanol is lower in California than in other states, 
and it imposes no civil or criminal penalties on non-compliant 
transactions completed wholly out of state. The district court 
identified several factors that might encourage ethanol 
producers to adopt less carbon-intensive policies. . . . For 
lifecycle analysis to be effective, it must consider all these 
factors and more. But California does not control these 
factors—directly or in practical effect—simply because it factors 
them into the lifecycle analysis.160 
While California “cannot exceed its powers” or “impose its own 
regulatory standards on another jurisdiction,” it “may regulate with 
reference to local harms, structuring its internal markets to set 
 
155. Id. at 1093. 
156. Id. at 1099. “We conclude that [the State’s] stated purpose was genuine. 
There was no protectionist purpose, no aim to insulate California firms 
from out-of-state competition.” Id. at 1100.  
157. Id. The court did remand the case to the district court to assess whether 
the provisions nevertheless impermissibly burdened interstate commerce 
under Pike balancing. Id. at 1100–01.  
158. Id. at 1106. 
159. Id. at 1101.  
160. Id. at 1102–03. 
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incentives for firms to produce less harmful products for sale in 
California.”161 
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union furnishes a potential roadmap 
for states wishing to successfully defend their RPS programs. First, 
the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of California’s fuel standards 
demonstrates the wisdom of adopting facially neutral regulations. 
Doing so shifts the burden to challengers to demonstrate that RPS 
provisions are discriminatory in purpose or in their effects. In 
addition, the case offers some aid to states wishing to adopt 
requirements that renewable energy be purchased from a particular 
geographic region or that some types of energy should be excluded. As 
long as states can demonstrate that the regional restrictions or the 
excluded energy source were adopted for some non-protectionist 
purpose (i.e., that transportation of the energy would contribute to 
harms the program was trying to ameliorate), then courts will likely 
be more receptive to upholding them. The Ninth Circuit’s concern 
with protectionism generally is of a piece with the Supreme Court’s 
own conception of the DCCD as concerned not simply with 
discrimination per se, but with discrimination in the service of 
protectionist aims.162  
Despite the fact that the court remanded for application of Pike 
balancing, it seems unlikely that a reviewing court would conclude 
that the burdens on interstate commerce “clearly exceed” benefits 
that might accrue to a state from the mitigation of climate change. 
The prospect of defending RPS programs on this much more 
hospitable ground is reason enough to design RPS programs to be as 
indifferent as possible to geography and in no event as a vehicle for 
protecting or enhancing parochial economic interests. 
Conclusion 
Given the difficulties of passing major structural legislation at the 
federal level, states will likely continue to lead the way in some 
environmental regulation—especially in controversial areas such as 
climate change mitigation. Those that do so should appreciate the 
federal constitutional doctrines that operate to constrain the states. 
At the moment, only one, the DCCD, seems to loom large. RPS 
programs furnish a good context in which to examine how the DCCD 
can restrict state choice.  
 
161. Id. at 1103–04. The court likewise rejected the related argument that 
California’s standards exposed producers to the risk of inconsistent and 
conflicting regulations. See id. at 1104–05. “If we were to invalidate 
regulation every time another state considered a complementary 
statute,” the court wrote, “we would destroy the states’ ability to 
experiment with regulation.” Id. at 1105.  
162. See supra Part I.B.2.a. 
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What might be termed RPS 1.0, not unlike earlier attempts to 
deal with state and municipal governments’ solid waste problems, 
could run into rough sailing in court, even in the absence of a federal 
RPS program preempting state efforts. Many current programs are 
framed in parochial and protectionist terms that will make courts 
wary of upholding them. Advocates of RPS programs recognize this; 
many have urged states to strip out or revise the provisions—such as 
in-state and in-region generation requirements—most vulnerable to 
invalidation under the DCCD. However, that doctrine itself is in some 
flux and RPS programs could furnish the impetus to alter its contours 
for the future, providing states with more flexibility, provided there 
are sufficient assurances that protectionism and economic self-dealing 
are not the primary motives behind the legislation.  
